Post by account_disabled on Mar 12, 2024 7:06:54 GMT
The Contentious-Administrative Chamber, Section 4 of the Supreme Court, in ruling 960/2023 of July 12, declares that “the duty to give a period of ten days for the correction of applications that have omitted the signature of the applicant or accreditation of the authenticity of your will expressed by any means', in the words of current art. 66.1.e) of Law 39/2015, is expressly provided for by art. 68 of the same legal body ”.
In this sense, it must be taken into account that, in the words of the Chamber, the current administrative procedure legislation has already been designed for the so-called "Electronic Email Data Administration" , which is evident from a simple reading of Law 39/2015 [1], that the normally normal mode of communication between the Administration and individuals is electronic. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult - if not impossible - to argue that the legal provision of the remediable nature of the omission of signature in applications is not applicable to applications submitted electronically . This also applies to those omissions that, without referring to the “electronic signature” itself, affect the “accreditation of the authenticity of the will” of the applicant, such as the final step of validating what was formulated and sent electronically.
In the case at hand, it is proven that the appellant followed all the steps , except the last, to submit her application electronically: it is clear that "she paid the fee, completed the form and recorded the application." In the absence of completing the last step, the appellant found the indication "application completed successfully." It is clear, therefore, that the only omission was that "he did not electronically sign his request nor did he register it in the electronic registry." This means that what is omitted is precisely the signature or accreditation of the applicant's will, an assumption contemplated by the current art. 66.1.e) of Law 39/2015, which gives rise to the duty to provide notice for ten days for correction, provided for in art. 68 of Law 39/2015. In short, the facts of the case are subsumable in the factual assumption of the norm.
Against this, the Administration objects that the computer program worked correctly and that, if all its steps are not followed, the Administration cannot be informed of the defective applications, stating that in the present case there is an absolute lack of presentation of application . Likewise, it raises another objection: that the appellant could have submitted its application through the traditional system.
In this sense, it must be taken into account that, in the words of the Chamber, the current administrative procedure legislation has already been designed for the so-called "Electronic Email Data Administration" , which is evident from a simple reading of Law 39/2015 [1], that the normally normal mode of communication between the Administration and individuals is electronic. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult - if not impossible - to argue that the legal provision of the remediable nature of the omission of signature in applications is not applicable to applications submitted electronically . This also applies to those omissions that, without referring to the “electronic signature” itself, affect the “accreditation of the authenticity of the will” of the applicant, such as the final step of validating what was formulated and sent electronically.
In the case at hand, it is proven that the appellant followed all the steps , except the last, to submit her application electronically: it is clear that "she paid the fee, completed the form and recorded the application." In the absence of completing the last step, the appellant found the indication "application completed successfully." It is clear, therefore, that the only omission was that "he did not electronically sign his request nor did he register it in the electronic registry." This means that what is omitted is precisely the signature or accreditation of the applicant's will, an assumption contemplated by the current art. 66.1.e) of Law 39/2015, which gives rise to the duty to provide notice for ten days for correction, provided for in art. 68 of Law 39/2015. In short, the facts of the case are subsumable in the factual assumption of the norm.
Against this, the Administration objects that the computer program worked correctly and that, if all its steps are not followed, the Administration cannot be informed of the defective applications, stating that in the present case there is an absolute lack of presentation of application . Likewise, it raises another objection: that the appellant could have submitted its application through the traditional system.